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Abstract: Recently Chairman Greenspan (2003 and 2004) has discussed a risk 
management approach to the implementation of monetary policy. This paper 
explores the economic environment of the 1990s and the policy dilemmas the Fed 
faced given the stock boom from the mid to late 1990s to after the bust in 2000-2001. 
Drawing on Greenspan’s comments about conducting monetary policy in the real 
world of risk and uncertainty, the paper assesses why US monetary policy was 
neutral with respect to the stock market boom.   
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1.  Introduction 
In a fascinating talk given at the 2004 Meetings of the American Economic 
Association, Alan Greenspan (2004, also see 2003) reflected on the implementation 
of monetary policy in the real world of risk and uncertainty. With Greenspan’s term 
as Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board coming to an end in January 2006, one 
might wonder if these comments were meant in part as advice to future chairs of the 
Fed. In this paper we use the policy making framework Greenspan laid out in his talk 
to try to develop a better understanding of what choices and dilemmas monetary 
policy makers faced during the stock boom in the mid to late 1990s and the bust in 
2000. 
Greenspan discusses monetary policy as an exercise in risk and uncertainty 
management. A monetary policy maker considers the possible future events that may 
occur due to economic shocks and changes in economic policy. In a world of risk, a 
well defined probability can be assigned to each event, with the probability being 
determined by the frequency of such events in the past. The choice of the optimal 
policy in this case can be thought of as the solution to minimizing a loss function 
with respect to a policy instrument, such as the Federal funds rate, subject to 
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constraints that describe the macroeconomy (see for example Svensson (2003)). 
However Greenspan argues that the world that monetary policy makers actually live 
has large elements of “Knightian” uncertainty rather than just risk. That is, while it is 
often the case that a set of future possible events can be envisioned it is less often the 
case that objective probabilities can be assigned to such events. Often academic 
economists take the view that risk and uncertainty are equivalent, so long as all 
possible future events are assigned at least subjective probabilities. However the 
choice of the subjective probabilities is just that: subjective.  
As Greenspan argues, while monetary policy makers may consider the 
solutions to well defined optimization problems in setting policy, they also use a 
large element of judgment that sometimes is hard to quantify even if the idea of 
subjective probabilities is mentioned in policy deliberations. For example, in the 
February 1994 FOMC meeting the debate was whether to increase the Federal funds 
rate 25 or 50 basis points. Greenspan favored a 25 basis point increase while some 
on the committee were initially leaning toward a 50 basis point increase. Greenspan 
argued that “Well, I’ve been around a long time watching markets behave and I will 
tell you that if we do 50 basis points today, we have a very high probability of 
cracking these markets” (see FOMC transcripts February 3 and 4 1994). Hayford and 
Malliaris (2001) discuss this event more completely and it seems clear that 
Greenspan’s view was based on his judgment or gut feel for the markets. It reflects 
the respect that the other FOMC members had for Greenspan’s judgment that FOMC 
choose to go with a 25 basis point increase in the funds rate. 
In a risk and uncertainty management approach to the implementation of 
policy, Greenspan argues that low objective or subjective probability events with a 
high potential loss have to be considered and responded to. Such possible future 
events, are typically not captured by simple rules that have been suggested for 
monetary policy, such as targeting monetary aggregates or more recently the Taylor 
rule for the Federal funds rate. Hence Greenspan argues that, while monetary policy 
can be informed by econometric models and monetary policy rules, ultimately 
anyone who becomes a central banker, comes around to the position that appropriate 
monetary policy involves a significant amount of discretion and subjective judgment. 
Next we explore the economic environment of the 1990s and the policy 
dilemmas the Fed faced given the stock boom from the mid to late 1990s to after the 
bust in 2000-2001. We will argue that the Fed faced considerable uncertainty at least 
prior to 2000 about both what was happening in the US economy and what the 
appropriate policy response was. 
 
2. The U.S. Economy in the 1990s 
It is always the case that the ever-changing nature of the U.S. economy presents 
continuous challenges to both economic agents and policy makers. During the 1990s 
several major events contributed both as external shocks to, as well as structural 
changes in, the economy and financial markets in the U.S.  For example, the end of 
the cold war with the collapse of the former Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s, the 
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growth of globalization and in particular the economic opening of China, the taming 
of inflation, the rapid technological innovations and scientific advances in fiber 
optics, telecommunications, computing, information management and biomedicine, 
among other factors, all caused important structural changes in the U.S. economy 
that potentially changed the quantitative behavior of the economy relative to the past. 
These factors contributed to the length and strength of economic prosperity which 
began in the second quarter of 1991 and ended at the end of the first quarter of 2001. 
During this 10-year economic boom, long-term interest rates decreased gradually, 
labor productivity increased and inflation declined. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Figure 1 presents data on key variables for setting monetary policy in the 
1990s. The data are quarterly and except for the stock market data are from the 
FRED® database maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
(http://www.stls.frb.org/fred/). The S&P 500 composite index and the P/E ratio are 
from the Standard and Poor’s Security Price Index Record. The top two graphs show 
the real GDP gap, as measured using the CBO measure of the potential real GDP as 
of April 2005 and the unemployment rate. These two graphs measure business cycle 
fluctuations in the 1990s. The bottom left graph shows inflation as measured by the 
growth rate of the consumer expenditure price index.  
The middle two graphs show the stock market as measured by the S&P 500 
composite index and the P/E ratio.  In the 1990s the stock market boomed. The S&P 
500 Index increased from 360 in July of 1990 to a peak of 1473 in July 2000, that is, 
the stock market grew at an average rate of 15.1% per year during this decade. This 
boom presented a challenge to monetary policymakers. In 1996, Greenspan made his 
how famous statement about the stock market potentially being driven by “irrational 
exuberance” stating that economic agents were excessively optimistic with a greater 
than average willingness to take risks thus causing asset prices to grow faster than 
economic fundamentals. Later in the decade Greenspan seemed to switch to a “new 
economy hypothesis” claiming that increased technological innovations had 
permanently increased labor productivity and real profit growth thus justifying the 
higher asset prices. 
The bottom right graph in figure 1 shows the effective Federal funds rate. One 
way to indicate the stance of monetary policy is to consider the value of the Federal 
funds rate relative to the “neutral Federal funds rate”. The theoretical foundation for 
this approach to monetary policy is developed by Woodford (2003) and is discussed 
in a recent speech by Fed Vice Chairman Ferguson (2004). The neutral funds rate is 
the sum of the natural real interest rate and the Fed’s implicit target for inflation. The 
natural real interest rate, typically estimated to be around 2%, is the real interest 
when real GDP equals potential real GDP. The Fed’s implicit inflation target is 
thought to be about 2% resulting in a neutral Federal funds rate of 4%. A Federal 
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funds rate above neutral implies a tight monetary policy while below neutral implies 
monetary ease. 
Since the actual neutral Federal funds rate is not known precisely, in the graph 
for the effective Federal funds rate we have indicated a tight monetary policy for a 
Federal funds rate at or above 5% and easy when it is at or below 3%. Using this 
approach, starting in 1990 monetary policy was tight but moving toward ease as the 
economy moved into a recession in 1990-91. By 1992 to 1993 monetary policy was 
neutral to border line easy. At the beginning of 1994 monetary policy moves from 
easy into the tight range by the end of 1994 and remains tight until 1998. There is a 
slight ease in 1998 due to the Russian debt crisis, after which monetary policy 
tightens to 6.5% at the end of 2000. Beginning in 2001 the Fed dramatically shifts 
from tight, to neutral to easy by the end of 2001. By 2003, the Federal funds rate is 
550 basis points below its peak level in 2000. Since 2004 the Fed has been moving 
the funds rate back to neutral.  
The relevant question for this paper is how much of these movements in the 
Federal funds rate were in response to inflation and the economic activity and how 
much was due to the Fed responding directly to a potential bubble in the stock 
market? Without any hard evidence to prove or disprove the existence of a bubble or 
determine its magnitude, the Fed and the rest of the world faced uncertainty about 
whether there was a bubble or not.  In addition, as discussed below, economists are 
uncertain about what the appropriate monetary policy response should be to an on 
going stock price bubble.  
Using the risk and uncertainty management framework, we can think of the 
Fed considering two possible events: 1) the stock market boom was a bubble, i.e. the 
“irrational exuberance hypothesis” or 2) the booms was being driven by 
fundamentals, i.e. the “new economy hypothesis”. If the  new economy hypothesis 
was true, and we can imagine monetary policy makers assigning their subjective 
probabilities to that event, the appropriate response of monetary policy was to stand 
back and enjoy the prosperity while keeping an eye on the usual variables, for 
example inflation and the real GDP gap. If the irrational exuberance hypothesis was 
true, then the Fed faced additional uncertainty about what the appropriate response of 
monetary policy should be. The Fed faced two policy choices which we call: (1) 
“asymmetric monetary policy response” and (2) the “symmetric monetary response” 
to the bubble. 
Hayford and Malliaris (2001, 2004a, 2005) present an analysis of the Fed’s 
transcripts and also give econometric evidence that suggest that the Fed 
accommodated the stock market bubble. They report estimates of Taylor type rules 
for monetary policy during this period including the P/E ratio as a measure of stock 
market valuation and find that movements in the Federal funds rate were due 
primarily to changes in inflation and unemployment. Rather than trying to dampen 
the stock market boom, Hayford and Mallairis argue that at best monetary policy was 
neutral with respect to the stock market boom or perhaps accommodated the boom.   
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The stock market peaked in the spring of 2000. The Fed responded in January 
2001 by lowering the Federal funds rate aggressively to reduce the impact of 
declining asset wealth and falling investment spending on aggregate demand.  Hence 
the Fed ended up following an asymmetric monetary policy response to the stock 
market bubble. Ex post both Fed Chairman Greenspan (2002) and Governor 
Bernanke (2002) have defended the Fed’s accommodation of the asset bubble by 
arguing that there is no low-risk, low-cost incremental monetary tightening that can 
reliably deflate a bubble.  
The response of the Greenspan Fed to the stock market bubble of the 1990s is 
similar to how other central banks have responded to bubbles. Greenspan (1999) 
suggests that this typical asymmetric response of central banks is due to an 
asymmetry in financial markets: “… central banks do not respond to gradually 
declining asset prices.  We do not respond to gradually rising asset prices.  We do 
respond to sharply reduced asset prices, which will create a seizing up of liquidity in 
the system.  But you almost never have the type of 180-degree version of seizing up 
on the up side.  If indeed, such an event occurred I think we would respond to it.  
The actuality is that it almost never occurs, so it appears as though we are 
asymmetric when, indeed, we are not.  The markets are asymmetric; we are not”.  
An overview of the literature on asset bubbles presented in Hunter, Kaufman 
and Pomerleano (2003) suggest that central banks have followed an asymmetric 
monetary policy response to a bubble more often than not. In other words, monetary 
policy makers have not typically taken the risk of bursting a bubble since doing so 
may cause financial and economic instability. The only support the symmetric 
monetary policy response to bubbles receives is at the early stages of the emergence 
of the bubble if the economy overheats and inflation increases.  However, one cannot 
claim in such a scenario that the central bank is responding to a bubble.   
The rest of the paper conjectures on why US monetary policy was neutral 
with respect to the stock market boom.  Our analysis draws on Greenspan’s 
comments about conducting monetary policy in the real world of risk and 
uncertainty. 
 
4. Assessing whether a bubble existed 
In mid to late-1990s some economists considered the question of how should 
monetary policy react to a stock market bubble as meaningless because there is little 
agreement on how to recognize a bubble ex ante. The theoretical literature defines a 
bubble as the difference between the actual market price and the fundamental price. 
However if the fundamental price cannot be objectively computed, then one can only 
talk about the existence and the magnitude of the bubble in terms of uncertainty with 
the consequent subjective probabilities. 
One common approach to accessing the existence of a bubble is to compare 
the current price earnings ratio with the historic average. The mean of the S&P 500 
P/E ratio for the post WWII period up until the 1990s is approximately 14. As shown 
in figure 1, for the entire period the P/E ratio is higher than 14, which suggests that 
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perhaps the stock market was over-valued. Hence using the level of the P/E ratio to 
assess stock market valuation, the market was clearly overvalued by the mid 1990s, 
relative to historic levels. Presumably this information increased the subjective 
probability that monetary policy makers assigned to the event that there was indeed a 
stock market bubble. 
Shiller (1989) and, more recently Salge (1997), offer an extensive review of 
the literature on market volatility and discuss both the theoretical and empirical 
issues associated with bubbles.  At the risk of oversimplification, one finding of this 
literature is that bubbles are easier to identify ex post rather than ex ante.  For 
example, it is difficult to find economists who would argue today that the stock 
market increase in Japan in the late 1980s or the Nasdaq increase in the late 1990s 
reflected only fundamentals.  The fact that in both cases these markets declined 
significantly is ex post evidence of the existence of a bubble, yet there was no 
consensus among economists prior to its dramatic collapse that a bubble was present 
in these two markets.  
In the 1990s the Fed could look to the bubble experiences in other countries 
and historical periods. Asset price bubbles have been a recurring event in capitalist 
economies since the invention of financial markets (see Kindelberger (1989)). Two 
examples of a central bank attempting to pop a stock market bubble are the United 
States in the 1920s and Japan in the 1980s. As is well known the Japanese stock 
market grew rather rapidly during the 1980s. When Japanese monetary policy chose 
to increase interest rates to dampen bubbles in the stock market and the real estate 
markets, eventually both markets collapsed along with the real economy. However 
the experience of Japan had with an apparent bubble in the 1980s and its collapse in 
1989 was thought to offer less insight for the United States since the asset bubble in 
Japan involved both the stock market and the real estate market and this was not the 
case in the U.S..   
The U.S. stock boom in the 1920s offers another historical example of a 
central bank attempting to stop an apparent stock market bubble.  Bordo and 
Wheelock (2004) explore the response of monetary policy to stock market bubbles 
and find that policy makers both during the 1920s and 1990s paid great attention to 
finding an appropriate response to bubbles. Hayford and Malliaris (2004b) discuss 
U.S. monetary policy during the late 1920s and argue while monetary policy in 1928 
was tightened to try to dampen stock market speculation the stock market continued 
to boom. It was only after the contraction in August 1929 that the Great Crash of 
October 1929 occurred. Hence the examples of the US in the 1920s and Japan in the 
1980s do not provide optimistic support for having central banks attempt to dampen 
or pop apparent bubbles.  
Another approach is to look to historical episodes of bubbles to determine the 
necessary conditions for bubbles to occur. This information can then be used to 
access the probability that an economy is currently experiencing a bubble. Bordo and 
Wheelock (2004) offer a detailed discussion of the role of monetary policy during 
periods of stock market booms and busts. They show that in the U.S. over the past 
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two centuries, stock market bubbles have emerged in a variety of macroeconomic 
conditions.  However, certain special characteristics appear to encourage and 
promote bubbles.  Key among these certain macroeconomic variables are (1) rapid 
growth in labor productivity due to technological innovations, (2) growth in the 
money supply reflecting either a passive accommodation by the central bank due to 
expanding bank credit or an easy monetary policy by design, and (3) low inflation 
and therefore relatively low nominal interest rates. Kindelberger (1989) lays out a 
similar set of initial conditions for an asset bubble to develop.  
One can argue that all these conditions existed in the 1990s, in particular a 
new technological innovation and low inflation. As Greenspan (2004) later put it 
“perhaps the greatest irony of the past decade is that the gradually unfolding success 
against inflation may well have contributed to the stock price bubble of the latter part 
of the 1990s”. The environment of low inflation and low interest rates, high labor 
productivity and major technological advances have all acted as preconditions for the 
occurrence of above normal stock market returns. Further this contributed to the 
formation of optimistic investor expectations and without any action by the central 
bank to moderate these expectations, moral hazard took root and fed the bubble. 
In summary, in December 1996, Greenspan suggested that maybe there was a 
bubble in the stock market. However bubbles are hard to identify ex ante. As the 
stock market continued to boom through the rest of the 1990s and the P/E ratio rose 
to even higher heights, Greenspan’s speeches and testimonies seemed to indicate a 
switch to the “new economy hypothesis”. However many economists and analysts 
expressed doubts about whether the stock price boom was being driven by 
fundamentals.  
 
5. How should a central bank respond to a bubble? 
A large number of papers address the question of how a central bank should respond 
to a stock price bubble. As mentioned above there are two competing hypothesis: 
asymmetric monetary policy response and the symmetric monetary response to asset 
bubbles. 
Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) argue for an asymmetric monetary policy 
response to asset price bubbles, that is, a central bank dedicated to a policy of 
flexible inflation targeting should pay little attention to asset price inflation because 
setting interest rates to achieve an inflation target will also stabilize asset prices.  The 
authors (1999, p.18) state that “[t]rying to stabilize asset prices per se is problematic 
for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that it is nearly impossible to know 
for sure whether a given change in asset values results from fundamental factors, 
non-fundamental factors, or both”. The sufficiency of targeting inflation can be 
argued as follows.  Keeping both current and expected inflation at a constant level is 
equivalent to maintaining output at its natural level.  The existence of a bubble can 
either cause no change in aggregate demand or cause it to increase because of the 
wealth effect or some other reason. In either case, the monetary rule of inflation 
targeting guides the central bank to act appropriately, either by doing nothing in the 
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case the bubble causes no change in aggregate demand or by tightening in the case 
the bubble increases aggregate demand via the wealth effect.  Hence, according to 
Bernanke and Gertler, the existence of a bubble should not cause the central bank to 
change its policy of targeting inflation during the period when assets prices are 
increase. After a bubble pops they argue that monetary should be expansionary to 
dampen the impact of declining asset prices on financial markets and the real 
economy.     
A number of other researchers also support the asymmetric monetary policy 
response to asset bubbles hypothesis. Bullard and Schaling (2002) use a simple 
macroeconomic model to study the implications of targeting inflation, output and 
equity prices. They show that monetary policy that reacts to equity price increases 
can interfere with the policy maker’s ability to minimize inflation and output 
variability.  They also show that under certain conditions, a policy of targeting stock 
market prices can lead to an indeterminate rational expectations equilibrium and 
hence a more unpredictable volatility than would be achieved if asset prices were 
ignored. Bullard and Schaling (2002) conclude that targeting the stock market 
reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy relative to just concentrating on 
inflation and output gap targeting. 
 Similarly, Cogley (1999) argues that deliberate attempts to puncture asset 
price bubbles may destabilize the economy and thus monetary policy may generate 
instabilities that are similar to the ones arising from the burst of a bubble. Goodfriend 
(2003) is also skeptical about the effectiveness of monetary policy to target asset 
bubbles.  He argues that the direction and size of the unconditional correlation 
between asset price movements and real short-term interest rates is not stable.  Thus, 
in principle, the appropriate direction and size of the interest rate response to equity 
prices would be difficult to discern in practice. Bean (2003) carefully reviews several 
theoretical models to conclude that in a flexible inflation targeting framework it is 
very difficult to find an appropriate role for asset prices, other than their 
informational input to forecast of future inflation and growth.   
Other researchers have argued for a symmetric monetary response to asset 
bubbles, that is, that central banks should increase interest rates in response to asset 
price bubbles, as well as cut interest rates when asset prices bubbles pop. A key 
assumption for a symmetric monetary response to asset bubbles to be optimal is that 
central banks can distinguish between a stock market bubble and a stock market 
boom caused by fundamentals. 
Cecchetti (1998) and Cecchetti, et al (2000) are the initial papers that argue 
for a symmetric monetary response to asset bubbles. The logic behind this argument 
is the idea that the policymaker must often trade off variability in output for 
variability in prices because it is generally not possible to stabilize both. More 
specifically, Cecchetti, et al (2000), argue that central bankers can improve economic 
performance by paying attention to asset prices. Their conclusion follows from 
simulations of a New Keynesian macro model, similar to that used by Bernanke and 
Gertler (1999). The key difference from Bernanke and Gertler is that Cecchetti, et al 
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(2000) assume that monetary policy makers know that an asset price bubble exists 
and also when it will pop. They also explore a larger family of policy reaction 
functions than the other authors. Continuing their support for the symmetric 
monetary policy response hypothesis, Cecchetti et al (2002) argue that there are 
sound theoretical reasons for monetary policy to improve the economy’s 
performance by reacting to asset price misalignments as well as targeting inflation. 
They also emphasize that monetary policy reactions to stock price bubbles must be 
qualitatively different from reactions to stock price increases driven by 
fundamentals, such as increases in productivity and earnings.  The concern with 
stock market bubbles is both their inevitable collapse but also the encouragement of 
over-investment and excessive borrowing by households and firms before the bubble 
collapse. Thus, bubbles can cause, both during their rapid growth and also after their 
collapse, serious economic imbalances that can cause either inflation or deflation.  
Filardo (2001, 2004) also explores the role of monetary policy in an economy 
with asset bubbles by developing a small-scale macroeconomic model and running 
various simulations. He finds that if there is no uncertainty about the role of asset 
prices in determining output and inflation then monetary policy should respond to 
asset prices.  However, if the monetary authority is sufficiently uncertain about the 
macroeconomic consequences of stock prices then it is preferable for monetary 
policy to remain neutral.  Very recently, Disyatat (2005) has conceptualized the 
essential elements of the theoretical debate about of the central bank’s appropriate 
response to bubbles and concludes that it is very difficult to resolve these issues 
analytically because the optimal control problem with a complicated loss function 
and nonlinear constraints does not allow for an explicit solution and only case by 
case simulations offer insights.   
In addition to these two competing hypotheses, several economists have 
broadened the scope of the debate by considering the response of the central bank to 
macroeconomic conditions of financial fragility and financial instability rather than 
just asset bubbles. For example, Bordo and Jeanne (2002) argue that asset price 
reversals can be very costly in terms of declining output, such as the cases of the 
U.S. in the early 1930s or of Japan during the 1990s. They go further to argue that 
traditional monetary policy may be unable to correct such asset price disturbances 
and therefore monetary policy should attempt, primarily, to discourage the 
emergence and growth of bubbles, rather than act after they burst in an effort to 
stabilize the economy. Beyond stock market bubbles and inflation targeting, Borio 
and White (2004) broaden their discussion by emphasizing the notion of financial 
stability. 
Blanchard (2000) argues that the analysis of Bernanke and Gertler (1999) is 
sufficient if asset inflation translates into price inflation via the wealth effect.  Thus, 
if the bubble increases consumption, via the wealth effect, that puts pressure on 
inflation, and Fed tightening guided by inflation targeting can be optimal. However, 
allowing monetary policy to ignore asset price bubbles may be costly, if the bubble 
causes publicly traded firms whose equity has increased to increase their investment. 
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In this case while inflation targeting keeps inflation constant, the stock market 
bubble results in a shift in the composition of output in favor of investment and thus 
potentially causes excessive capital accumulation.  When ultimately the bubble 
bursts this excessive capital accumulation deters firms from investment and 
postpones economic growth. Thus inflation targeting does not address issues related 
to the impact of a bubble on the composition of output and the long-run impact of the 
bubble on capital accumulation and growth.        
Therefore what is the answer to the normative question: should monetary 
policy react to an asset bubble?  Clearly after the bubble bursts, monetary policy 
should always act in order to stabilize the economy.  Both competing hypotheses 
agree that monetary policy should respond aggressively by lowering Fed funds after 
the collapse of the bubble. However, while the bubble is growing, it is difficult to 
argue what monetary policy should do because it is not clear how to identify a 
bubble and estimate its size. Also, it is not certain that a central bank can deflate 
slowly the bubble.  A central bank, in its attempt to control the bubble may end up 
bursting it and thus cause financial instability that it wanted to prevent in the first 
place. Or, even worst, central bank may raise interest rates to slow down the bubble 
growth, and then observe that such increases accelerate the growth of the bubble as 
the Greenspan Fed witnessed in 1994.  
 
6. Assessing the risk and uncertainty faced by Fed in the 1990s 
To sum up the previous sections, from the mid 1990s to 2000, the stock market 
boomed. During this time where was an ongoing debate about the source of the 
boom: was it driven by a speculative mania and hence was it a bubble that would 
eventually burst, or was it driven by fundamentals? If the stock market boom was 
driven by fundamentals, then there was no need for the Fed to act to try to stop the 
boom. If the boom was being driven by a bubble then the Fed faced the choice of 
whether to tighten monetary policy to try to dampen or pop the bubble or to act 
asymmetrically and just respond after the stock market bubble eventually burst. 
Given the uncertainty about whether there was a bubble or not, and given the 
ambiguity about the appropriate monetary policy action and its consequences for the 
economy, the Fed chose to wait. After the bubble burst the Fed reduced interest rates 
to dampen the impact of the stock market collapse on the real economy. The next 
section discusses the political risks and uncertainties the Fed faced if it attempted to 
deflate the apparent stock market bubble. 
 
7. The political risk and uncertainty of acting against the stock market boom 
Even though the Fed is an independent government agency, it was created by an act 
of Congress in 1913. Monetary policy makers are well aware of this fact and know 
that if the policies they implement are sufficiently unpopular politically they face 
will political pressure from Congress and the President and potential change in the 
institutional structure of the Fed. Hence without at least implicit political consensus 
and support from Congress and the President, the Fed will not undertake what might 
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be considered radical changes in the monetary policy. While the idea that Congress 
would  change the institutional structure of the Fed, for example making it part of the 
U.S. Treasury, might be considered a very low probability event, as Greenspan 
states, in a risk-uncertainty management framework, low probability events that 
would result in large losses have to be insured against.  
To see the role that politics has played in the setting of monetary policy, 
consider the “great inflation” in the United States. From 1965 to 1979 the trend rate 
of inflation accelerated. It took fifteen years of accelerating inflation for a political 
consensus to develop to disinflate the economy via a recession (see DeLong (1997)). 
After a false start in October 1979, the Fed tighten monetary policy from November 
1980 to August of 1982 resulting in the deepest recession in the US since the Great 
Depression. The 1981-82 recession was successful in lowering the trend rate of 
inflation down to the 2 to 4% range.  Mussa (1994) suggests that use of targeting 
monetary aggregates during this period was partly politically motivated in attempt to 
diffuse the responsibility for higher interest rates away from the Fed. In addition, 
Mussa argues that the timing of the second tightening of monetary policy in 
November 1980, right after the Presidential election and the abandoning of the use of 
monetary aggregate targets in August 1982, three months before the mid-term 
elections was also politically motivated. In the twenty years since the Fed has been 
successful in maintaining low inflation. Alan Greenspan (2004) attributes the low 
inflation since the mid 1980s in part to the political support for low inflation.  
Clearly goods price inflation is politically unpopular. However no such 
public consensus existed for monetary policy to try to pop the stock market bubble of 
the 1990s. In fact, at the time the investing public seemed to enjoy the stock price 
inflation. In addition as discussed above, during the 1990s there was no consensus 
among economists that a bubble did exist. It seems conceivable that if the Fed had 
decided to increase the Federal funds rate solely for the reason of trying to stop the 
stock market boom that this act would have been very politically unpopular and 
much more difficult to defend than raising interest rates to stop goods price inflation. 
Hence increasing interest rates to pop the bubble would have increased the 
probability, however low it might be, of a loss of institutional independence of the 
Fed. Given that this event would cause a large loss for the Federal Reserve System as 
an institution, and also potentially to society at large. Research suggests that a loss of 
central bank independence may result in higher trend goods price inflation. Thus, 
political risks and uncertainty, offer an additional reason for the Fed taking no action 
to deflate the bubble. 
 
 8. Conclusion   
The Fed faced considerable risk and uncertainty in selecting the appropriate response 
of monetary policy to the stock market boom of the 1990s. As the boom continued in 
the late 1990s, the Fed as well as everyone else was uncertain whether the boom was 
driven by fundamentals or irrational speculation. If the boom was a bubble, the Fed 
faced the policy choice of either attempting to pop the bubble by raising interest rates 
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or remaining neutral with respect to the stock market. This paper suggests that risk of 
attempting to pop were both economic and political. Increasing interest rates 
dramatically enough to stop the stock market boom would have likely caused a 
significant slowdown in the economy. Given the lack of political support for a pre-
emptive move against the stock market, the political risks to the Fed for such a move 
were high. In the end, in the midst of the uncertainty about the bubbles’ existence 
and size and in view of the risks to the real economy of a monetary tightening, the 
Fed chose an asymmetric respond to stock prices. That is, a neutral monetary policy 
while the stock market was booming and a dramatic cut in interest rates after the 
stock market bust appeared to be threatening real economic activity.  
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